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A ‘PICK AND MIX’ APPROACH TO COLLECTIVE REDUNDANCY 
Abstract 
The recent litigation on collective redundancy rights
1
 raised a number of important issues, all of which centred 
on whether the national practices in the UK and in Spain were compliant with the relevant EU legislation. The 
importance of ensuring that the collective redundancy regime operates appropriately has once again reared its 
head following the collapse of BHS and Austin Reed, and may do again following a vote for Brexit. Inevitably 
the Court of Justice of the European Union played a pivotal role in interpreting the scope of the legislation, with 







. This paper will give consideration to the issues raised across these three cases. To 
this end the primary focus of this paper is on the interpretation of the term ‘establishment’, which is central to 
the working of the Collective Redundancies Directive. This paper identifies the approach adopted by the CJEU 
in interpreting this concept, before questioning whether an alternative approach may have been more desirable. 
The second part of this paper considers questions concerning vertical direct effect of the Directive, and 
horizontal direct effect of rights that are contained within the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
5
 Whilst this paper 
will be led by the UK position and the decision of the European Court in the USDAW litigation, reference will 
also be made to the decisions in Lyttle and Cañas where appropriate, given the close nexus between these cases.  
 
I. COLLECTIVE RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 
 
Over the previous six years there have been significant casualties as a consequence of the 
economic crisis, including Comet in November 2012, which resulted in the closure of 236 
stores with a loss of some 6,895 workers, Blockbuster in November 2013, with 264 stores 
closed and 2,000 workers made redundant, and Phones4U in September 2014, which closed 
720 outlets with around 5,600 redundancies being made. Of more recent times there has been 
the collapse of both BHS, which had been part of the British High Street since 1928, and 
Austin Reed which had been operating since 1900, both of which entered administration 
during summer 2016. The demise of BHS will see the closure of 164 stores, with a loss of up 
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 In particular United States v Nolan [2014] EWCA Civ 71, USDAW v Ethel Austin Ltd (in administration) and 
another case [2012], UKEAT/0547/12/KN and UKEAT/0548/12/KN, Lyttle and ors v Bluebird UK Bidco 2 Ltd 
[2013] NIIT 00555_12IT and Akbar and ors v. Comet Group Ltd (in Creditors Voluntary Liquidation) and 
Secretary of State for Business Innovation and Skills [2014], Case no: 1102571/2012. 
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 Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers (USDAW), Wilson v. WW Realisation 1 Ltd, in liquidation, Ethel 
Austin Ltd, Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Case 80/14,  ECLI:EU:C:2015:291. 
3
 Valerie Lyttle and Others v. Bluebird UK Bidco 2 Limited, Case C-182/13, ECLI:EU:C:2015:317. 
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 Andrés Rabal Cañas v. Nexea Gestión Documental SA and Fondo de Garantía Salarial, Case C-392/13, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:318. 
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 Although this paper seeks to raise the importance of general principles it is beyond it to develop this 
discussion further.  
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to 11,000 jobs, whilst the Austin Reed brand will see around 120 stores close with a loss of 
some 1,000 jobs. The number of redundancies involved is not insignificant in any of these 
situations, and one would think that given that each situation involves multiple redundancies 
that the collective redundancies regime would apply. Furthermore, there is nervousness in the 
market at present following the result of the UK referendum of 23 June 2016, and whether 
Brexit will result in redundancies due to relocation of businesses. However, whether and 
which workers are or will be afforded collective consultation remains narrow, with, arguably, 
many of these workers currently falling outside of the remit of the relevant protections. 
It is in light of the collapse of leading household names during the recession that the rights 
afforded upon collective redundancy were widely scrutinised in the media. This scrutiny 
intensified on the collapse of Woolworths, a store that had been part of the nationwide retail 
landscape across the UK for generations. The litigation that followed from such liquidations 
led to the questioning of whether the UK’s approach was in compliance with the EU’s parent 
Collective Redundancy Directive
6
 (the ‘CRD’). This was particularly evident in the USDAW 
litigation surrounding the collapse of Ethel Austin and Woolworths. Here it was examined 
whether the legal protection was constructed too narrowly so as to exclude some workers 
from the consultation process and was thus in breach of European obligations, and if that was 
the case, whether there were legal tools or principles that could operate to ensure wider 
protection under the relevant legislation so as to ‘fix’ the protections. Similar questions were 
asked in both Lyttle - in relation to the Northern Ireland approach to collective redundancy- 
and in Cañas - in relation to the Spanish approach. Although this line of case law has now 
concluded
7
, this paper will focus on the submissions raised during the recent cases of 
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 This was initially introduced through Directive 75/129/EEC, which was amended by directive 92/56/EEC and 
consolidated in Directive 98/59/EC.  
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, with a view to questioning whether the evident restrictive 
approach adopted by the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) was the correct 
approach, or whether a more inclusive approach was possible, which would have better 
achieved the principle aims of the Directive and thus would have provided a stronger social 
right going forward.   
 Interestingly, especially considering the restricted approach alluded to above and 
further detailed below, if one places the CRD in its historical context it becomes evident that 
it was developed during a period where there was a growing trend towards enhancing the 
consultation of workers at EU level in a number of specific contexts
11
, which included the 
European Works Council Directive and the European Company Statute, and according to 
Barnard was an issue that had formed part of the European Commission’s agenda since the 
early 1970’s.
12
 This move toward a more complete system of employee consultation is 
evidenced by Hall, on discussing the implementation of the EU Information and Consultation 
Directive through the Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations, when he 
expressed that they ‘…represent a significant extension of the range of issues on which 
employees have statutory rights to be informed and consulted, introducing a comprehensive 
legal framework for information and consultation for the first time…’
13
. Referencing these 
regulations as an extension of consultation rights, would imply a suitable level of worker 
consultation existed in the specific contexts that had already existed, including collective 
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 Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers (USDAW), Wilson v. WW Realisation 1 Ltd, in liquidation, Ethel 
Austin Ltd, Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Case 80/14,  ECLI:EU:C:2015:291. 
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 Valerie Lyttle and Others v. Bluebird UK Bidco 2 Limited, Case C-182/13, ECLI:EU:C:2015:317. 
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 Andrés Rabal Cañas v. Nexea Gestión Documental SA and Fondo de Garantía Salarial, Case C-392/13, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:318. 
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 For a useful account of the growing trend towards worker consultation see:  Hall, Assessing the Information 
and Consultation of Employees Regulations, (2005), Industrial Law Journal, 103-126, at pp.104-110; Catherine 
Barnard, EC Employment Law (3rd ed, OUP, 2006), discussed at chapter 15, and Weiss, Workers’ Participation 
in the European Union, chapter 10 in Davies et al European Community Labour Law, principles and 
perspectives, 1996, Oxford University Press. 
12
 Barnard, at page ?? 
13
 Hall, p.125. 
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redundancies, but also highlights the ongoing commitment to consultation of workers at EU 
level.
14
   Further support for the continuing desire on the part of the EU to ensure adequate 
employee consultation rights comes from Doherty, where he considers that ‘[s]uch a view is 
explicit in Title III of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which specifically protects workers' 
rights to information and consultation within the undertaking and Articles 137-139 EC, which 
promote "social dialogue." It is against this background that the current approach to 
consultation rights under the CRD, following the CJEU decisions in USDAW, Lyttle and 
Cañas, arguably does not sit comfortably.   
The consultation rights that workers have when they are subject to collective 
redundancies are derived from the CRD. The significance of the protection can be read at 
Recital 2, which states “that greater protection should be afforded to workers in the event of 
collective redundancies while taking into account the need for balanced economic and social 
development within the Community.” 
Article 1 of CRD provided Member States with two options when transposing the 
protection, leaving each state with the choice on how they were going to define a collective 
redundancy, being: 
(i) either, over a period of 30 days: 
at least 10 in establishments normally employing more than 20 and less than 
100 workers, 
at least 10% of the number of workers in establishments normally employing 
at least 100 but less than 300 workers, 
at least 30 in establishments normally employing 300 workers or more, 
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 Doherty,  ‘It's good to talk... isn't it? Legislating for information and consultation in the Irish workplace’ 
D.U.L.J. 2008, 30, 120-137. 
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(ii) or, over a period of 90 days, at least 20, whatever the number of workers normally 
employed in the establishments in question 
It is only Option 1 that makes a link between the numeric of the redundancies to the 
overall number of workers within an establishment. Under both Options it is evident that 
understanding the term establishment is important.
15
 In addition to this, if a worker is 
employed in a Member State where Option 1 has been transposed
16
 there is a need to know 
two pieces of information before one can conclude whether there is a right to information and 
consultation under CRD: (1) how many workers are being made redundant? and; (2) how 
many workers are employed at that establishment? The answer to each of these questions is 
crucial. Conversely, Option 2
17
 only has one additional piece of information that needs to be 
determined to activate the right, namely, how many workers are being made redundant?
18
 
Option 2 incorporates no link to the overall size of the workforce.  
In terms of the right itself, Article 2(1) states that “[w]here an employer is 
contemplating collective redundancies, he shall begin consultations with the workers' 
representatives in good time with a view to reaching an agreement”. It is thus explicit in the 
Directive that the consultation right activates at a point in time when the employer is 
contemplating collective redundancies, rather than when the decision has been made. This 
suggests that the underlying rationale of the Directive is to inform and consult with the 
affected workforce with a view to avoiding, or at the very least reducing, the need for 
                                                          
15
 There was a submission made in the USDAW case on the point that determining the meaning of 
‘establishment’ does not appear important, as the English, French, Italian and Spanish version CRD, utilises the 
plural ‘establishments’, and so prima facie has an expanded scope; however, this argument is not being taken 
forward. This was expressed as irrelevant by A-G Wahl (see para. 53), and the CJEU. The CJEU identified that 
there was no distinction between EU MSs that transposed Option 1 or Option 2 and their choice of the singular 
or plural. Further, despite the UK and Spain adopting different transposition models they both elected to use 
the plural ‘establishments’. This is  particularly highlighted at para.55 of the USDAW decision. This appears to 
be a matter of inconsistent choice of terminology across MSs rather than a specific choice for the purpose of 
expanding the concept.,  
16
 This includes Denmark, Greece, Belgium and Romania. 
17
 This includes the UK and Croatia.  
18
 The threshold number of redundancies is considered over a reference period of at least 90 days.  
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redundancies, rather than undergoing consultation when the decision has already been 
reached.
19
 This is certainly logical since Article 2(2), which provides substance to the 
information and consultation right, states that “[t]hese consultations shall, at least, cover ways 
and means of avoiding collective redundancies or reducing the number of workers affected, 
and of mitigating the consequences…” 
The primary aim of the right is therefore evidently to reduce as close to zero the 
number of redundancies that are required. Such an aim can only be satisfied if the 
consultation takes place before any decision is made
20
; it is a right to pre-redundancy decision 
consultation.  
 
II. THE UK APPROACH TO COLLECTIVE REDUNDANCIES 
The UK transposed the EU’s CRD through the Trade Union and Labour Relations 
(Consolidation) Act 1992 (‘TULRCA’)
21
:  
188. Duty of employer to consult … representatives 
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 The trigger point was raised in Nolan; however, due to the specific circumstances of the case the situation 
fell within the derogation contained at Article 1(2)(b) CRD, covering ‘workers employed by public 
administrative bodies or by establishments governed by public law’, and thus the CJEU proffered no guidance 
on this matter (see Judgment in Nolan, C-583/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:638; this approach was followed when the 
case returned to the CA). The trigger point question, although not addressed by either the EAT or the CA in the 
Woolworths litigation, could be crucial to the vertical direct effect argument that has been raised.  
20
 Although there may be exceptional circumstances where the undertaking in question has the decision 
imposed upon them by an over-arching decision maker and at short notice which makes it impossible to 
undertake the necessary consultation in advance of a decision, as alluded to by A-G Mengozzi: Advocate 
General Opinion in Nolan, C-583/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:160. 
21
 A similar approach is evident in Northern Ireland, where the CRD was transposed though Part XIII of the 
Employment Rights (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 and by Part IV, Chapter II of the Trade Union and Labour 
Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992. The approach in the Spanish system is very different, as this, on the face of 
it, appears to be an Option 1 transposition, although it was described as a hybrid of the two in the Opinion of 
A-G Wahl at paragraph 66. The Spanish transposition of the CRD was through Article 51(1) of the Ley del 
Estatuto de los Trabajadores (Law on the Workers’ Statute). This is not being replicated here as it does not add 




(1) Where an employer is proposing to dismiss as redundant 20 or more 
employees at one establishment within a period of 90 days or less, the 
employer shall consult about the dismissals all the persons who are 
appropriate representatives of any of the employees who may be affected by 
the proposed dismissals or may be affected by measures taken in connection 
with those dismissals. 
(1A) The consultation shall begin in good time and in any event – 
(a) where the employer is proposing to dismiss 100 or more employees 
as mentioned in subsection (1), at least 90 days
22
, and 
(b) otherwise, at least 30 days, 
   the first of the dismissals takes effect. 
In line with the Directive, s.188 TULRCA does not link the number of redundancies 
to the overall number of the workforce, and so one would think that this would not cause a 
problem to cases that come before the UK domestic courts; however, it is apparent on the 
face of s.188 that the UK position may have at least three inconsistencies with that required 
by the CRD:  
(i) it restricts the right to the concept of ‘employee’, whereas the Directive uses 
the more expansive term ‘worker’; 
(ii) it expresses the right as arising at a point in time when there are dismissals 
proposed, rather than in mere contemplation; and  
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 The period of consultation for affected workers was reduced on the 6 April 2013 by the current 
government to 45 days: The Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (Amendment) Order 
2013 (SI 2013/763). 
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(iii) Consideration of the number of workers is restricted to those employed at ‘one 
establishment’ rather than the more expansive approach of establishments.  
In order to give effect to the right, s.189 TULRCA provides a remedy in the form of a 
protective award for non-compliance with the consultation rights, with compensation being 
awarded for any such failure. To give further substance to the right, by virtue of s.184(2)(d) 
of the Employment Rights Act 1996, if the employer who is liable under a protective award is 
insolvent it will be a debt that is guaranteed by the Secretary of State. 
However, the focus of this paper is on the battleground that was a common 
consideration in the USDAW
23
 litigation, Lyttle and ors v Bluebird UK Bidco 2 Ltd
24
 and in 
Cañas
25
:  with whom must an employer consult when making collective redundancies? Thus, 
the focus is solely on the third of these three potential inconsistencies. 
 
III. A RETAIL REDUNDANCY STORY: WOOLWORTHS, ETHEL AUSTIN 
AND BON MARCHE   
The issue of the ‘affected employee’ for consultation rights was central to the litigation 
surrounding the demise of both Woolworths and Ethel Austin in the UK courts
26
, the 
proceedings before the Northern Ireland Tribunal in Lyttle concerning the closure of Bon 
Marche stores, and redundancies that took place in the company Nexea, which formed part of 
the Correos commercial group in Cañas. Of paramount importance in each of these cases was 
a determination of whether the number of redundancies was to be read over a single 
employment unit or all units that make up the relevant business. The importance of this 
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 See USDAW (n 1). 
24
 See Lyttle (n 1). 
25
 See Cañas (n 5). 
26
 This paper will only be considering the employment tribunal actions; however, it is worth noting that 
alongside the employment law actions there were also criminal law actions  
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determination can be best seen through the factual circumstances of the closure of 
Woolworths and Ethel Austin stores.
27
  
Ethel Austin entered administration on the 8 March 2010, impacting upon the 
employment position of some 1,700 members of staff. When Woolworths ceased trading on 3 
January 2009 there were over 27,000 employees that were to be made redundant. However, 
before each of the respective Employment Tribunals
28
 it was held that s.188 TULRCA 
operated on a singular unit basis, meaning that although USDAW had successfully argued for 
protective awards for some members of staff due to consultation failures, those employed at a 
shop or store where less than 20
29
 were being made redundant saw their claim fail. This 
resulted in 1210 out of 1,700 staff of Ethel Austin and 3,233 of Woolworth’s employees not 
being awarded a protective award.  
The decisions in USDAW were appealed to the EAT, and again to the Court of Appeal 
on the following grounds: did the ET fail in construing s.188 in a manner that would give 
effect to the protections founded under the CRD (that is did the duty to consult arise when 
there was a total of 20 employees being made redundant across the relevant business as a 
whole or did it only arise at a singular establishment when at least 20 were made redundant at 
that site)? In the alternative, could the right to information and consultation be derived 
through the European principle of direct effect? 
                                                          
27
 Although the facts of any number of closures could have been selected to highlight the problem, such as the 
closure of Comet stores or the Barratt’s administration, all of which impacted upon vast numbers of workers, 
which were spread across different sized employment units. A more recent example is the current ongoing 
situation surrounding the administration of Phones 4 U. 
28
 The Ethel Austin was first heard by the Liverpool Employment Tribunal on 20 November 2011 under the 
chairmanship of Employment Judge Robinson, whereas the Woolworths case was first heard by the London 
Central Employment Tribunal on 19 January 2012, presided over by Employment Judge Dr Simon Auerbach. 
29
 The same situation existed following the collapse of the Comet group in 2012. Following a failure to consult 
with the staff that Comet were making redundant, Employment Judge Forrest in the Leeds Employment 
Tribunal ordered, by Order of 11 June 2014, that there was a failure to comply with s.188 TULCRA, and that 
consequently protective awards were to be made. However, similar to the situation with Woolworths and 
Ethel Austin, some of the employing stores employed less than 20 workers, and so the decision in USDAW, 
became important in this context as it had a direct impact on those employees that were made redundant 
from a Comet store that employed less than 20 employees.  
10 
 
Similar issues were also present in the Lyttle case, in which the Northern Ireland Tribunal 
referred
30
 the following questions to the CJEU, with the hope of being provided with some 
clarity on the matter: 
1. In the context of Article 1.1(a)(ii) of the 1998 Directive, does ‘establishment’ have the 
same meaning as it has in the context of Article 1.1(a)(i)?   
2. If not, can ‘an establishment’, for the purposes of Article 1.1(a)(ii), be constituted by 
an organisational sub-unit of an undertaking which consists of or includes more than 
one local employment unit? 
3. In Article 1.1(a)(ii) of the Directive, does the phrase ‘at least 20’ refer to the number 
of dismissals across all of the employer’s establishments, or does it instead refer to the 
number of dismissals per establishment?  (In other words, is the reference to 20 a 
reference to 20 in any particular establishment, or to 20 overall?) 
The Court of Appeal in USDAW
31
 referred the matter to the CJEU
32
. Whereas the Lyttle 
litigation focuses solely on the concept of ‘establishment’, the USDAW litigation introduces 
additional interesting questions concerning direct effect. Alongside considering other issues, 
including whether the expiration of a fixed-term contract contributed to the redundancy 
calculation, the central focus in Cañas was on the proper construction of the term 
‘establishment’, and thus each of the three decisions, although not formally joined, were 
considered alongside one another given their clear overlap. This paper now turns to consider 
the issue that was present in all three of the cases, the concept of ‘establishment’, before 
turning to consider the matter of direct effect, as raised in the USDAW litigation.  
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 The reference was lodged by the Northern Ireland Tribunal on 12 April 2013.  
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 USDAW & Anor v Ethel Austin Ltd & Ors [2014] EWCA Civ 142. 
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 The reference was lodged on 14 February 2014. 
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IV. DEFINING ‘ESTABLISHMENT’  





. The EAT in USDAW expressed the view that there was nothing in the 
implementation discourse prior to s.188 TULCRA being introduced to suggest that the right 
would be restricted to circumstances where there were 20 or more dismissals at a ‘single 
establishment’.
35
 Instead the focus was to be solely on the total number of dismissals across 
the undertaking.
36
 This contrasted with the ET’s view and subsequent application of the 
protection, with the respective ET’s in USDAW being in agreement that s.188 TULCRA’s use 
of ‘singular establishment’ rather than the plural narrowed the consideration of the workplace 
so as to look at individual employment units. It was this narrowing down of the scope of the 




The EAT indicated that the ET’s approach excluded a “very substantial number of 
employees from the right”
38
, and that there “should be some interpretation to yield the 
outcome that the obligation arises when 20 or more are to be dismissed irrespective of where 
they work”
39
; the appellate court considered the ET approach to be too narrow.
40
 In response 
the EAT considered that this restriction could be removed, and EU compliance ensured, if the 
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 This was also the approach in Northern Ireland. The Spanish approach did differ.  
34
 The EAT supported this conclusion by giving consideration to the pertinent Parliamentary debates that took 
place at the time that s.188 was implemented, in particular the views of the then Government spokesman Lord 
Chesham. This was further accepted by the CJEU at para 44. 
35
 See USDAW (n 1), para 24 et seq. 
36
 It was noted that there were similar views expressed in relation to the explanatory notes which 
accompanied the transposing regulations. 
37
 Although non-compliance will depend on whether the CJEU considers the narrow approach applied in the ET 
as too restricted. 
38
 Such a view is supported by the CJEU, para 61: although this is worded from the point of view that 
aggregating dismissals across all establishments of an undertaking would ‘significantly increase the number of 
workers eligible for protection’, the sentiment is the same.  
39
 See USDAW (n 1), para 35. 
40
 See USDAW (n 1), para 29. 
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meaning of ‘one establishment’ could be interpreted
41
 to cover the entire undertaking of the 
employer.
42
 The EAT further considered submissions on direct effect as an alternative means 
of providing affected employees with the correct redress.
43
 
The debate between the narrow and restricted approach to establishment adopted by 
the ET and the broader and more inclusive approach favoured by the EAT reached its 
ultimate conclusion when the CJEU held that “Article 1(1)(a)(ii) of Directive 98/59 must be 
interpreted as not precluding national legislation that lays down an obligation to inform and 
consult workers in the event of the dismissal, within a period of 90 days, of at least 20 
workers from a particular establishment of an undertaking, and not where the aggregate 
number of dismissals across all of the establishments or across some of the establishments of 
an undertaking over the same period reaches or exceeds the threshold of 20 workers”.
44
 In 
other words the decision of the CJEU supported a narrow interpretation of the concept, with a 
focus on singular establishments rather than an aggregated approach.  
Despite these very different conclusions across the different levels of the UK courts 
there was one thing in common: each reached their respective decisions after giving 
consideration to European Court of Justice (‘the ECJ’, as it then was) jurisprudence in this 
area; however, despite collective redundancy consultation rights having existed at European 
level since 1975 there is little guidance on the concept of establishment, and no guidance 
                                                          
41
 This option is available for national provisions transposing EU instruments through the principle of indirect 
effect: see Judgment in Marleasing, C-106/89, ECLI:EU:C:1990:395. If so required a court may even add or 
remove words in order to ensure a compliant interpretation can be found: judgment in Coleman, C-303/06, 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:415.  
42
 An alternative submission put forward by USDAW was to delete the words “at one establishment”. 
Interestingly, the EAT proffered a further option of requiring consultation being triggered across the relevant 
business so long as at least one establishment were making 20 or more establishments; however, this does not 
appear to solve the problem: see M Butler, ‘The recent decision of USDAW v Ethel Austin Ltd: collective 
redundancy, to consult or not to consult? (Case Comment)’, Insolvency Intelligence [2013], 9-12. 
43
 There is almost a hierarchy in terms of the order of the tools to be used when there is a potential conflict 
between national law and EU law, with the application of interpretative methods generally considered to be 
the first available tool. See Advocate General Bot’s Opinion in Kücükdeveci, C-555/07, ECLI:EU:C:2009:429, 
paras 59-60. 
44
 USDAW (n.1), para 71.  
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when dealing within the context of Option 2 Member States. The extent of the European 




, which, although of 
questionable relevance, were taken to offer some guidance as to how the concept should be 
defined in Option 2 States, including the UK. 
  
A. Rockfon and Athinaiki: the factual matrix 
Rockfon formed part of the multinational group Rockwool International, which employed 
some 5,300 workers in total, 1,435 of which were based in Denmark. Of those 1,435, 1,085 
worked in Hedenhusene. There were four companies from the Rockwool International Group 
based in Hedenhusen, one of which was Rockfon. For efficiency purposes Rockfon and the 
three other companies shared a personnel department, which was part of Rockwell A/S, one 
of the other companies located in the Hedenhusene area. All decisions on dismissals and 
redundancies by any one of the four companies within the group had to be taken in 
consultation with that personnel department.  
In 1989, Rockfon, which had a total of 162 employees, dismissed 24/25 workers due 
to shortage of work; however, it did not comply with rules on notification or the consultation 
procedure protected under Danish national law pursuant to Directive 75/129/EEC
47
. The 
Danish Labour Council held that Rockfon formed part of a larger undertaking, the Rockwell 
group, which employed more than 300 workers. As a result Rockfon were found not to have 
infringed the law, since the Danish law giving effect to the Directive only required 
consultation to be undertaken where at least 30 workers were affected over a period of 30 
days in companies employing more than 300. This decision was upheld by the Board of 
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 Judgment in Rockfon, C-449/93, ECLI:EU:C:1995:420. For a useful case analysis see Craig, ‘”Establishment” 
and Redundancy Consultation’ Employment Law Bulletin [1996], 9-12. 
46
 Judgment in Athinaïki, C-270/05, ECLI:EU:C:2007:101. 
47
 This is the earlier version of the CRD.  
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Employment on appeal, before it was overturned before the Byret District Court, which made 
a finding that Rockfon was itself an ‘establishment’ since it retained the powers of dismissal, 
with the joint personnel department merely having a consultative role. As such Rockfon 
ought to have notified the workers of the redundancies
48
, and as a result of failing to do so 
was then required to pay compensation.  
When the issue was heard on appeal by the Østre Landsret, the court referred the 
following question to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling:  
Is article 1 of Council Directive (75/129/E.E.C.) of 17 February 1975 on the 
approximation of the laws of the member states relating to collective redundancies to 
be interpreted as meaning that it precludes two or more interrelated undertakings in a 
group, neither or none of which has decisive influence over the other or others, from 
establishing a joint recruitment and dismissal department so that, for example, 
dismissals in one of the companies can only be effected with the approval of that 
department and so that the total number of employees in the companies is accordingly 
to be taken into account in determining the number of employees under article 1(1) of 
that Directive? 
The question to be determined by the ECJ was thus whether the term ‘establishment’, 
which was not defined in the Directive
49
, was to be interpreted to mean all the undertakings 
using the personnel department together as a group, or each undertaking taken separately.  
                                                          
48
 Bearing in mind that Option 1 States required consultation where at least 10% of the workforce was being 
made redundant for establishments employing 100-300 workers. 
49
 The ECJ also makes it clear that ‘establishment’ is a Community term and thus cannot be defined by 
reference to the laws of the Member States, see Judgment in Rockfon, ECLI:EU:C:1995:420, paras 23 and 25. 
Thus according to the ECJ ‘[establishment] must, accordingly, be interpreted in an autonomous and uniform 
manner in the Community legal order’. As such simply using different terminology, for example labelling 
something as an operating unit will not preclude that part of the business from falling within the concept of 




This can be compared to the position in Athinaiki, which involved a Greek company 
that consisted of three separate units that were located in three different locations: a unit for 
the manufacture of writing paper, printing paper, mechanical pulp, chip-board and aluminium 
sulphate with a staff of 420 people; a second unit for the manufacture of soft kitchen paper, 
toilet paper, bags and so forth, and; a third unit for the processing of soft paper. Each unit was 
a distinct unit, utilising their own specialist equipment and workforce and employing their 
own chief production office responsible for overseeing that unit’s production; however, 
similar to the position in Rockfon, some companywide decisions, such as purchasing of 
materials and costing of products, were made centrally based on the information provided by 
each individual unit. Additionally, there was also a central joint accounts office, which was 
responsible for financial matters such as invoicing and the payment of wages. 
By a decision of the 18 July 2002 the first unit was closed down, resulting in almost 
all of the workers attached to it being dismissed by reason of redundancy. Workers’ 
representatives entered into statutory consultation following invitation by letter on 22 July 
2002, and the competent Labour Inspectorate was notified, as required under Greek law. 
During consultation the workers’ representatives were only provided with the financial 
information of the affected unit, and not the company’s general company information. 
Despite there being an extension to the consultation period due to no agreement being 
reached, the company did not attend further negotiations, and instead proceeded to make 
redundancies.  
Following an appeal by the company against the workers’ success in arguing a breach 
of the consultation requirements to the Efetio Thrakis (Thrace Court of Appeal), the 
following question was referred to the ECJ:  
16 
 
Do the foregoing facts found by the Efetio Thrakis fall within the meaning of the 
Community term "establishment", for the purpose of applying the Council directives 
referred to in the grounds of this decision and Law? 
In other words, does a unit such as that in question, where much of its operations are 
distinct but with certain fundamental aspects of it not being independent from the company as 
a whole, fall within the concept of ‘establishment’ for the purposes of the CRD? In essence 
the same question was asked in Athinaiki as was in Rockfon, with a determination of the 
concept of establishment under the CRD being required.  
 
B. Rockfon and Athinaiki: a flexible approach to the concept of “establishment”? 
Firstly, both Advocate-General (hereinafter ‘A-G’) Cosmos
50
 and the ECJ
51
 in Rockfon made 
it clear that the Directive does not impact upon the arrangements put in place by interrelated 
undertakings in a group to deal with recruitment or dismissal; however, with the caveat that 
such arrangements must not act in a manner which circumvents the Directive’s protections.
52
 
Therefore there is no obligation to ensure that individual units retain powers, such as in 
recruitment or dismissal, in order to be considered an ‘establishment’ for the purposes of the 
CRD.  
On the issue of interpreting the term ‘establishment’ both the Court
53
 and A-G 
Cosmos
54
 in Rockfon adopted the view that “different language versions of a Community text 
must be given a uniform interpretation and in the case of divergence between the versions the 
                                                          
50
 Advocate General Cosmos’s Opinion in Rockfon, C-449/93, ECLI:EU:C:1995:242, para 22. 
51
 Judgment in Rockfon, ECLI:EU:C:1995:420, para 22. 
52
 Judgment in Rockfon, ECLI:EU:C:1995:420, paragraph 30, and Advocate General Cosmos’s Opinion in 
Rockfon, ECLI:EU:C:1995:242, para 22. 
53
 Reference was made to the judgment in Bouchereau, Case 30-77,  ECLI:EU:C:1977:172. 
54
 Reference was made to the Cricket St Thomas case. 
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provision in question must … be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme 
of the rules of which it forms part”
55
,  the purpose being identified as twofold: (i) to regulate 
and harmonise this area and (ii) to promote improved working conditions and an improved 
standard of living for workers.
56
 A-G Cosmos also identified a further underlying principle, 
the protection of workers in the event of collective redundancies, which was also to be taken 
into consideration when interpreting the term ‘establishment’.
57
 Consequently, it is against 
the backdrop of providing partial harmonization of collective redundancy procedures whilst 
not restricting “the freedom of undertakings to organize their activities and arrange their 
personnel departments in the way which they think best suits their needs”
58
, that the 
interpretation of ‘establishment’ was to be made.
59
  
A-G Cosmos referred to the travaux préparatoires, stating that the original proposal 
of the Directive used the term undertaking and that, in the last subparagraph of Article 1(1) of 
the proposal, this was defined as a 'local employment unit'.
60
 This was later replaced with the 
term ‘establishment’, with the supporting definition being removed as it was now considered 
unnecessary. A-G Cosmos concludes by suggesting that should the Community legislature 
have wanted the term to apply to the broad establishment then more appropriate terminology 
would have been adopted.
61
 Further support for this conclusion came from the Acquired 
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 Judgment in Rockfon, ECLI:EU:C:1995:420, para 28; similarly see Advocate General Cosmos’s Opinion in 
Rockfon, ECLI:EU:C:1995:242, para 36. 
56
 This purpose was identified due to the dual legal bases of Article 100 and 117 EC being utilised. In support of 
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Cosmos’s Opinion in Rockfon, ECLI:EU:C:1995:242, paragraph 41, this is followed by the ECJ, see Judgment in 
Rockfon, ECLI:EU:C:1995:420, para 29. 
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 Advocate General Cosmos’s Opinion in Rockfon, ECLI:EU:C:1995:242, para 38. 
58
 Advocate General Cosmos’s Opinion in Rockfon, ECLI:EU:C:1995:242, para 43: ‘effective protection for 
workers by approximating the laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies’. 
59
 Judgment in Rockfon, ECLI:EU:C:1995:420, para 21. 
60
 'unité locale d'emploi', 'örtliche Beschäftigungseinheit': Advocate General Cosmos’s Opinion in Rockfon, 
ECLI:EU:C:1995:242, para 44, this is also supported by the ECJ, see Judgment in Rockfon, ECLI:EU:C:1995:420, 
para 33. 
61
 Although this is not explicit in the ECJ judgment it is certainly implicit. This is returned to later as a point of 




Rights Directive case of Botzen
62
, where the ECJ held that “an employment relationship is 
essentially characterized by the link existing between the employee and the part of the 
undertaking or business to which he is assigned to carry out his duties”.
63
 This could be taken 
to suggest a narrow interpretation of the term; however, the ECJ does not appear to have 
followed the A-G Opinion in this respect, adopting a more flexible approach: 
The term 'establishment' appearing in Article 1(1)(a) of the Directive must therefore 
be interpreted as designating, depending on the circumstances, the unit to which the 
workers made redundant are assigned to carry out their duties. It is not essential, in 
order for there to be an 'establishment', for the unit in question to be endowed with a 
management which can independently effect collective redundancies.
64
  
Introducing the factor of ‘depending on the circumstances’ introduces flexibility, 
which suggests that there may well be situations and arrangements of a company that will 
require consideration of all units of the undertaking together when considering that 
‘establishment’ for the purposes of collective redundancies.
65
 This has the consequence of 
raising the question: in what circumstances, if any, will such an alternative approach be 
required? A question to which there is no answer to as yet, but one that is, and will continue 
to be important in the context of any case involving an Option 2 MS and a company that has 
numerous offices that are situated throughout the MS territory.  
In Athinaiki, the ECJ developed the definition of the concept further in stating that an 
‘establishment’ in the context of an undertaking “may consist of a distinct entity, having a 
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 Judgment in Botzen, Case 186/83, ECLI:EU:C:1985:58, para 15. 
63
 Judgment in Rockfon, ECLI:EU:C:1995:420, para 31 and Advocate General Cosmos’s Opinion in Rockfon, 
ECLI:EU:C:1995:242, para 45. 
64
 See Judgment in Rockfon, ECLI:EU:C:1995:420, para 32. Support for this definition can be found in judgment 
in Athinaïki, ECLI:EU:C:2007:101, para 25. 
65
 This broad interpretation is expressed as having the desire to prevent as far as possible companies 
establishing complex business practices with the aim of limiting the application of the Directive- see judgment 
in Athinaïki ECLI:EU:C:2007:101, para 26. 
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certain degree of permanence and stability, which is assigned to perform one or more given 
tasks and which has a workforce, technical means and a certain organisational structure 
allowing for the accomplishment of those tasks”
66
; however, that “the entity in question need 
not have any legal autonomy, nor need it have economic, financial, administrative or 
technological autonomy, in order to be regarded as an 'establishment'”
67
, nor must it have 
separate powers to effect redundancy
68
, or have a geographical separation from the other 
units and facilities of the undertaking.
69
 Such decisions being taken separately by an 




Similarly, in Rockfon, the decision on the meaning of establishment has to be 
evaluated taking into account the objective being pursued alongside the socio-economic 
effects of collective redundancies. It is clear that the ECJ does not want to preclude any 
particular business setup from being an establishment
71
, with determination being wholly fact 
dependent. As such it must be the case that the definition will change depending on what is 
required in the circumstances to achieve the underlying objectives of the CRD.   
A simple interpretation of the Rockfon and Athinaiki decisions, which appears to have 
been accepted by many
72
, is that the ECJ determined that an establishment refers to a local 
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 Judgment in Athinaïki, ECLI:EU:C:2007:101, para 27. 
67
 Judgment in Athinaïki, ECLI:EU:C:2007:101, para 28. 
68
 This was already dealt with in Rockfon, see judgment in Rockfon, ECLI:EU:C:1995:420, para 34, but reiterated 
here. 
69
 Judgment in Athinaïki, ECLI:EU:C:2007:101, para 29. 
70
 Judgment in Athinaïki, ECLI:EU:C:2007:101, para 32. 
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 Guidance that can be deduced from case law in the UK suggests that in order to be an establishment there is 
a need for some degree of permanence, either through a building, some form of administration, centralisation 
of records, or tools and equipment: see Barley v Amey Roadstone Corp Ltd [1977] ICR 546; Barratt 
Developments (Bradford) v Union of Construction, Allied Trades and Technicians [1978] ICR 319, and; E Green & 
Sons (Castings) Ltd v Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staffs [1984] ICR 352. This guidance is 
clearly no longer valid given the Rockfon and Athinaiki decisions.  
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 See for example Craig, “Establishment” and redundancy consultation, (1996), Employment Law Bulletin, 9-
12; McMullen, Well intentioned decisions from ECJ may backfire in the UK, (1996), Commercial Lawyer, 60-61, 
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site; an undertaking can thus consist of numerous sites, of which each can be viewed as a 
separate establishment for the purposes of the CRD. This resulted in the Rockfon case of each 
of the four production companies within the group being viewed as individual establishments, 
and in the Athinaiki case of the three separate production units in three different locations that 
made up the undertaking also be viewed as separate establishments. Applying such an 
approach to high street names, such as Woolworths and Comet, this would translate to 
individual stores.  
Although these two decisions may be taken, on the face of them, as suggested above, 
to suggest that establishment needs to be interpreted narrowly and focus upon individual units 
rather than the establishment as a whole, the converse is arguable, and indeed more attractive 
from a worker protection point of view. Such a definition must be placed into context and be 
considered against the backdrop of the intentions of the Court, which was to define “the term 
'establishment' very broadly, in order to limit as far as possible cases of collective 
redundancies which are not subject to [the CRD]”.
73
 The ECJ was not providing a single 
definition of establishment but appears to be accepting that the definition will differ 
depending on the circumstances of the case and what is required to achieve the desired 
protections for the workers affected. Interpreting the term establishment narrowly in Option 1 
states has the consequence of requiring evidence of lesser numbers of redundancies in order 
to invoke the consultation rights due to a link with the size of the establishment itself; 
however, this differs in Option 2 states where there is no link to the size of the employing 
institution, and in fact the converse is true, in that a wide definition of establishment will lead 
to a greater capture of situations which would require consultation. Logically, when an 
Option 2 state is involved, the ECJ ought to have applied a wider definition that read across 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and; Employment Law: collective redundancies- definition of establishment, (2007), Commercial Law 
Practitioner, 108-109.   
73
 Judgment in Athinaïki, ECLI:EU:C:2007:101, para 26. 
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the collection of units that made up the establishment as a whole. Such an approach is 
reconcilable with Rockfon and Athinaiki since the ECJ in those cases provided a caveat to its 
interpretation of establishment, stating that it “may consist of a distinct entity [own emphasis 
added]”, but ultimately this is “depending on the circumstances”. This dicta suggests that 
there could be alternative definitions available within the European concept of establishment. 
The definition could have been considered option specific in order to achieve the underlying 
principle, with Option 2 States being these different circumstances in which a widened 
definition of establishment was adopted in order to limit the collective redundancy situations 




C. USDAW & Wilson, Lyttle and Cañas: a downward spiral in social rights 
harmonisation   
The suggestion above highlights a teleological interpretation of the concept establishment, 
based on the relevant CJEU jurisprudence, that would have ensured that the CRD was given 
widened scope, in accordance with its aim of ensuring that as many collective redundancies 
as possible would be captured by the CRD. However the CJEU in USDAW, Lyttle  and in 
Cañas opted for a more restrictive approach
75
, and considered that this explicit aim would be 
outweighed by two other underlying implicit objectives of the CRD: (i) the need to ensure 
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 Not only will adopting this widened interpretation require expansion of the scope of the UK protections, but 
it also ensure reparation of any losses suffered by the affected workers through the principle of state liability. 
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the judgment somewhat.  
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comparable protection for workers’ rights in all MS, and (ii) the need to ensure comparable 
costs for undertakings in different MS.
76
 However, despite expressing these two objectives 
there is little supporting evidence that suggests that an option-specific approach to the 
concept of establishment would distort the levels of worker protection or costs in Option 2 
MS when compared to those who adopted Option 1.  
Arguably, adopting an option specific concept of establishment, as argued above, which 
aggregates singular units in Option 2 MSs would actually introduce comparable protections 
to workers and comparable costs to those present in Option 1 MSs. Such an assertion is 
supported through a simple consideration of the impact that the two alternative interpretations 
would have on Option 2 MS when compared to those that elected for Option 1: 
 In Option 1 a narrow interpretation of establishment will capture a larger number of 
redundancies as collective redundancies given the link in the threshold criteria 
between the number of redundancies and the number employed by the establishment 
and thus such an interpretation will give maximal coverage to the protections, along 
with associated costs for affected employers. 
 In Option 2, if the same narrow interpretation to the concept of establishment is 
adopted then this will only capture the minimum number of redundancies as collective 
redundancies, thus reducing the scope of the protection and any associated costs 
considerably in comparison to that of Option 1. Maximum exposure to the 
consultation right under Option 2 would only be achieved through a more inclusive 
interpretation, and it is only in these circumstances that a comparable level of 
protection, as desired by the CJEU, would be achieved. 
                                                          
76
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Such argument can be taken even further through using a hypothetical example to highlight 
the differences between Option 1 and Option 2 approaches, which also contradicts the 
CJEU’s assertion that “[t]he option in Article 1(1)(a)(ii) of Directive 98/59, with the 
exception of the difference in the periods over which the redundancies are made, is a 
substantially equivalent alternative to the option in Article 1(1)(a)(i)”.
77
 Although it is 
accepted that the principle aim of the approach is to ensure equivalent alternatives, the CJEU 
fails to appreciate the extent of the consequence in terms of protection afforded that using 
different thresholds has. Although the Court has expressly accepted that there is an intention 
to “maximise the application of the duty to consult … when applied in the British context this 
interpretation may considerably reduce the occasions when the 20-employee threshold is 
crossed”
78
. It is this contradiction that the current CJEU approach has introduced.  
Consider a hypothetical company that is made up of two distinct stores and a head office, 
which is arranged and operates in a manner analogous to the way in which Woolworths 
and/or Ethel Austin operated. Each store employs 25 workers, with a further 25 employed in 
head office. If the decision is made to make 15 workers redundant in each store and a further 
15 workers redundant from head office, then protection will differ depending on which MS 
the company is operating in, if the narrow singular establishment approach is adopted across 
both Option 1 and Option 2: 
 In Option 1 Member States all 45 workers will be subject to consultation pursuant to 
the CRD. As each of the three establishments in which redundancies are taking place, 
having between 20-100 workers, satisfy the redundancy threshold of 10 
redundancies, then a collective redundancy will be deemed to take place.  
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 Expressed by the CJEU at para 56. 
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 Deakin and Morris, Labour Law, Fifth Edition, 2009 Hart Publishing, at para 9.32. 
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 In Option 2 MSs if the single employment unit approach to establishment is applied 
then none of the workers will receive consultation as each of the units have less than 
the required 20 redundancies, even though 60% of the entire workforce is being made 
redundant; however, this changes, if a more inclusive approach to establishment is 
applied such as to aggregate the redundancies across establishments, as suggested 
above, as this would have the consequence of the 20 redundancy threshold being met. 
In other words by applying a more inclusive approach in Option 2 MSs then a wholly 
different outcome is reached, and one that ensures wide consultation rights.  
Applying the different approaches available to such a hypothetical example highlights 
the practical consequences of adopting a singular employment unit approach across the two 
options. This potentially leads to much less consultation and social protection in Option 2 
States when compared to those that adopted Option 1, and thus introduces incomparable 
levels of protection, which is counter to the suggestion of the CJEU. If one equates the level 
of protection and extent of consultation rights with costs incurred for carrying out the social 
right, then this also runs counter to CJEU’s justification based on incomparable costs.  Ford 
makes an interesting point with regards the harmonisation of costs rational, expressing that 
adopting such a justification then the ‘…envisaged harmonisation is, naturally, downwards 
not upwards...’
79
 This would contradict the traditional view of a Directive being a floor of 
rights, which provides a baseline against which upward harmonisation will occur. Taking this 
further, linking social right to an implicit aim of cost management introduces the potential to 
further weaken such rights in future considerations. It is difficult to accept that the 
justifications behind this approach, that of ensuring comparable rights and comparable costs, 
are met through taking such a rigid approach to the definition of establishment, especially 
when it is clear that the CJEU has in effect adopted a definition that offers as wide a net of 
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protection as possible for Option 1 MSs, but as narrow as possible for those that adopted 
Option 2.
80
 It is difficult to identify comparability in that respect. Ford describes this as a 
‘…quiet adjustment of the weight of objectives [which] allowed the ECJ to fall back on the 
[undefined] “ordinary meaning” of “collective redundancies”’. 
Although the Advocate General and the CJEU appear to be expressing the underlying 
aim of comparability in terms alluding to levels of protection (which is reinforced by the link 
with costs, when one appreciates the increased costs associate with the increased provision of 
a social right such as consultation), the clear inference is that there was a desire for legal 
certainty
81
, which would require a term, such as establishment, to be interpreted consistently 
across the available options, as to do otherwise may hinder this important principle. However, 
a clear weakness exists in this argument in that this would only be applicable where a distinct 
and rigid definition had been attached to the concept of establishment by the ECJ in Rockfon 
and Athinaiki. Had the ECJ in this line of case law stated that establishment solely refers to a 
single employment unit
82
 then introducing an alternative definition to a static concept could 
impact upon the idea of coherency and consistency, and to some extent introduce uncertainty 
in relation to predicting the correct approach to be adopted. However, as identified above, the 
CJEU did not attach an explicit and static definition to ‘establishment’, but instead appears to 
have left the concept open to future development and alternative interpretation where 
required (presumably in order to achieve its explicit aims, such as that needed under Option 
2). Both A-G Wahl and the CJEU appear to have interpreted the previous ECJ decisions as 
providing a definitive and precise definition of establishment, whereas this does not appear to 
be the case. Although the intentions of both A-G Wahl and the CJEU - the desire to ensure 
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conformity and consistency - cannot be faulted, the approach adopted has clear implications 
for the protections afforded in Option 2 Member States, and appears to have reduced the 
protections afforded during a period when strong protection for worker’s was needed. Both 
A-G Wahl and the CJEU touch upon an important point that could be considered should 
revision of the Directive ever take place: altering the Option 2 definition of collective 
redundancy to the wider concept of ‘undertaking’
83
 would remove the problems of 
consistency and coherency, whilst properly achieving the aim of comparability in this area 
and enhancing social protection. 
 
V. CONSULTATION RIGHTS, DIRECTLY EFFECTIVE? 
Alternative arguments based upon the right to consultation under the Directive being directly 
effective were also raised before the EAT in USDAW
84
; however, the EAT faced two quite 
significant hurdles in this respect:  
(i) the UK had transposed the Directive through their own national law framework,  
(ii) European Directives lack horizontal direct effect so as to have an impact between two 
private parties.  
To try to circumvent these difficulties submissions were made based firstly, on 
disapplication of the national law and reliance on consultation rights as contained at Article 
27 of the Charter in accordance with the principles developed in Kücükdeveci (at least before 
the EAT), and secondly, on vertical direct effect of the Directive against the Secretary of 
State. 
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A. Disapplication of national law 
Although the EAT in USDAW accepted
85
 the submissions of Ms Rose QC that it had the 
power to dis-apply provisions of national law that were incompatible with European law in 
these circumstances,
86
 and it initially formed part of the grounds of appeal, neither the Court 
of Appeal or the CJEU heard submissions on this issue due in large to the decision of the 
CJEU in Association de médiation sociale.
87
 Despite this decision not to pursue the horizontal 
direct effect of Article 27 of the Charter it is still worth considering this issue as not only may 
it still be a live issue which could have been questioned further and offered an alternative 
route to enhanced collective redundancy consultation rights, but it raises wider ranging 
principles that may have implications for other Charter rights.  
It is not the purpose of this paper to question whether the Court/Tribunal is 
empowered to dis-apply national legislation that offends Union law principles
88
, but to 
question whether the approach accepted by the EAT was the correct application of these 
principles, and if not, to question what the correct application of these principles should be in 
any subsequent case where such argument is raised. The cases of Kücükdeveci and Mangold 
are crucial in understanding how this principle works.  
Mangold concerned national legislation that authorised, without restriction, the 
conclusion of fixed-term contracts of employment once the worker had reached the age of 52. 
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The case reached the ECJ before the transposition period of Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 
27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and 
occupation (hereinafter the ‘Framework Directive’) had expired and thus in a technical sense 
Germany were not yet in breach of their European obligations with respect age discrimination 
protection. The issue in this case was whether the German government were required to take 
steps to alleviate the consequences of this national legislation in light of the pending 
protections that were forthcoming. Kücükdeveci concerned national legislation that 
discriminated on the grounds of age by disregarding employment service accrued before the 
age of 25 when calculating statutory notice periods. In contrast to Mangold, this offending 
legislation was still in operation post-expiration of the Framework Directive’s transposition 
period. Similar to the Mangold case, the key question referred to the ECJ in Kücükdeveci 
focussed on whether the offending legislative provision needed to be disapplied.  
Importantly, when one considers the overall context of the two cases, the ECJ 
observed that the Framework Directive was not the source from which age discrimination as 
a principle of equal treatment derived, but that this merely established a general framework 
for combating discrimination on this ground: 
… the source of the actual principle underlying the prohibition of those forms 
of discrimination being found, as is clear from the [first] and fourth recitals in 
the preamble to the directive, in various international instruments and in the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States.
89
  
A-G Bot further stressed the constitutional importance of the prohibition of age 
discrimination by emphasising its development, including its inclusion as a criterion of 
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prohibited discrimination in Article 13(1) EC
90
, and more recent developments in the form of 




Despite criticisms by A-G Bot of the limited rationale adopted in Mangold
92
, the 
decisions of Mangold and Kücükdeveci reached a common conclusion that the Framework 
Directive was merely the manifestation of a protection that already existed on a constitutional 
level. The principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of age was thus to be regarded as a 
general principle of EU law.
93
 A-G Tizzano made it clear that where a Directive is simply the 
manifestation of a general principle, as was the case in both Mangold and Kücükdeveci, then 
the obligations on EU Member States are exactly the same whether the protection is 
considered under the Directive itself or with reference to the General Principle.
94
 This was 
developed further to suggest that in these circumstances it makes sense to evaluate the 
national legislation against the general principle “since, being a general principle of 
Community law imposing an obligation that is precise and unconditional, it is effective 
against all parties ...”
95
 and thus does not have the problem of being ineffective between two 
private parties.
96
 This would enable disapplication of national law and subsequent reliance on 
the general principle as a source of EU law, both vertically and horizontally.
97
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A distinction can be drawn between Directives that are based upon a general principle 
of EU law that have had the transposition period expire, and those where the period has yet to 
expire. To enable disapplication of national law based on the Directive alone, in situations 
before the transposition period has expired, would introduce horizontal direct effect through 
the back door. As a consequence, in such situations, disapplication of national law and 
subsequent reliance on EU law is only available where there is a recognised EU general 
principle. Whereas in the former situation, as the general principle and the protections 
afforded under the Directive are essentially one and the same, and accordingly must have the 
same legal source, a Directive which is merely the manifestation of a constitutional principle 
can be used alongside the general principle to dis-apply the offending national law and 
provide the missing rights, in both vertical and horizontal relationships.
 98
 This is supported 
by A-G Bot: 
I would ask the Court to take a more ambitious approach in terms of action to 
counteract discrimination which is contrary to Community law, an approach which 
does not in any way involve a head-on confrontation with its classic case-law 
concerning the lack of horizontal direct effect of directives. That position, which is 
based largely on the specific nature of the directives intended to counteract 
discrimination and on the hierarchy of norms in the Community legal order, is that a 
directive which has been adopted to facilitate the implementation of the general 
principle of equal treatment and non-discrimination cannot reduce the scope of that 
principle. The Court should therefore, as it has done in regard to the general principle 
of Community law itself, accept that a directive intended to counteract discrimination 
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may be relied on in proceedings between private parties in order to set aside the 
application of national rules which are contrary to that directive.
99
  
Although it must be said that from a practical point of view this distinction makes 
very little difference, since such an approach will always be reliant upon finding an 
underpinning EU constitutional/general principle, or a norm of primary European law from 




It was on the basis of the constitutional importance of age discrimination protection, 
and in circumstances where other interpretative tools were unavailable to the national court to 
achieve the aims of the European legislation, that the ECJ concluded that a national court 
“hearing a dispute involving the principle of non-discrimination in respect of age, to provide 
… the legal protection [derived] from the rules of Community law and to ensure that those 
rules are fully effective, setting aside any provision of national law which may conflict with 
that law”.
101
 This appears to follow the clearly worded Opinion of A-G Tizzano that the 
general principle of equality, is sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional for it to be 
directly effective and thus binding on all legal persons, which includes upon private parties 
both against the State and against other private parties.
102
 As a consequence A-G Tizzano 
considers that there “is no doubt that in that eventuality the national court would have to dis-
apply a national rule held contrary to that principle which is regarded as having direct 
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 In a similar vein the ECJ concluded that national courts, in order to comply with 
their obligation of ensuring full effectiveness of this constitutional principle, may be required 
to dis-apply offending national laws.
104
  
Taking both the Mangold and the Kücükdeveci decisions together it leaves us with the 
conclusion that national law can only potentially be disapplied and substituted for European 
rights, such as those contained within a Directive
105
 or the Charter
106
, is if the right being 
pursued is based upon a general principle of EU law, and where no other interpretative tools 
are available to achieve this same end result. It is therefore crucial in such circumstances to 
first identify an underlying general principle of EU law, as otherwise this route appears 
closed off. The presence of a legal document alone as a source of a European right does not 
appear sufficient to enable dis-application of national law.   
There was a potential opportunity for the CJEU to address this approach in 
Association de médiation sociale, where it was faced with a similar issue as that in 
USDAW
107
, namely whether Article 27 of the Charter, expressing the principle of information 
and consultation for workers, which was specified in the provisions of Directive 2002/14, 
could be invoked in a dispute between private parties.
108
 The question being asked, as 
summarised by the CJEU, was whether: 
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Article 27 of the Charter, by itself or in conjunction with the provisions of 
Directive 2002/14, must be interpreted to the effect that, where a national provision 
implementing that directive, such as Article L. 1111-3 of the Labour Code, is 
incompatible with European Union law, that article of the Charter can be invoked in a 
dispute between individuals in order to disapply that national provision.
109
 
In considering this matter the CJEU reached the conclusion that the principle of 
information and consultation contained within Article 27 of the Charter and the CRD differed 
from the considerations in Kücükdeveci, since in that case the matter concerned the principle 
of non-discrimination on the grounds of age, which was sufficient in itself to confer rights 
between individuals
110
, whereas the Charter envisaged that the rights would be given more 
‘specific expression’ in EU or national law before becoming fully effective
111
; it is not 
disputed that such a requirement would lead to the conclusion that the Charter right itself was 
not sufficiently clear to enable it to be directly effective. However, it is questionable whether 
the situation in Kücükdeveci was wholly different from that in Association de médiation 
sociale in reality. Arguably, a general principle, such as age discrimination, that was 
manifested through further EU action, such as a Directive, which itself required more 
‘specific expression’ in national law, is not too dissimilar to that which was considered in 
Association de médiation sociale.  
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The focus of the CJEU in Association de médiation sociale was on the Charter right 
itself, without consideration of any underlying constitutional principle; accordingly this case 
did not question the matter that is at the heart of the Mangold and Kücükdeveci cases: is there 
an underlying general principle of which the Charter is simply the manifestation of? Such a 
question was clearly still open to USDAW to refer to the CJEU, even following Association 
de médiation sociale. This may have been a question worth raising since if the consultation 
right was established as a general principle of EU law then TULCRA could then have been 
dis-applied if it was found to be too restrictive, with the general principle and the Charter 
right and/or the CRD, as a manifestation of those protections, then being afforded horizontal 
direct effect between the parties.
112
 This can be considered a missed opportunity, given that 
this may have provided some indication as to how the CJEU would deal with submissions 
relating to the Charter being a manifestation of EU constitutional/general principles
113
, which 




B. Vertical Direct Effect 
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A second fall back argument that was raised before the EAT in the USDAW case
115
 was based 
on vertical direct effect against the state, which also formed part of the questions referred to 
the CJEU. However, the CJEU declined to answer this question, on the basis that the UK’s 
approach was found to be compatible with Directive 98/59, and thus this question became 
redundant.
116
 However, this paper turns to consider this submission, primarily on the basis 
that the CJEU could be considered to have reached this conclusion based on a potential 
misapplication of its previous jurisprudence, as discussed above, and as such consideration of 
this matter is very much worthwhile. Furthermore, there may be other Member States that 
have transposed the CRD incorrectly, against which similar submissions may be made. The 
argument, as raised, was based on the fact that the Secretary of State was joined as a party in 
USDAW, and that from that point onwards it had responsibility for ensuring payment of the 
protective awards to all of the affected employees. This submission is predicated on section 
188 and 189 of the Employment Rights Act 1996, under which a protective award made 
against an insolvent employer is treated as a preferential debt, which is recoverable against 
the Secretary of State. Although this submission, as with the others, was accepted by the 
EAT, it is stated to have had “less confidence in that argument”
117
, and it is easy to appreciate 
why.  
There were evidently two rights at play in USDAW:  
(i) the substantive right of consultation itself; and  
(ii) the enforcement mechanism.  
These two rights are inseparably intertwined in that the enforcement mechanism is 
reliant on a breach of the substantive right to become operable; however, this does not mean 
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that by virtue of the consultation right being capable of being directly effective against the 
state that the enforcement mechanism would likewise be directly effective, or vice-versa. 
Direct effect requires each aspect to be considered individually. 
In order for a provision to be directly effective it has to be sufficiently clear, precise 
and unconditional so as to be capable of being applied directly in a national court.
118
 The 
purpose of direct effect is thus to identify justiciable rights which can be properly protected 
within national courts; it is purely a matter of enforcement of rights. The consultation right as 
found in the CRD appears to satisfy this test and would therefore be capable of vertical direct 
effect.  In contrast the enforcement mechanism, on the face of it, appears to lack the requisite 
clarity or precision for direct effect, with Article 6 CRD providing: 
Member States shall ensure that judicial and/or administrative procedures for the 
enforcement of obligations under this Directive are available to the workers’ 
representatives and/or workers. 
Although this provision will not affect any direct effect of the substantive right
119
 it 
does raise an interesting question, which could have been crucial to the USDAW case: can 
rights be held directly effective against the state or an emanation of the state if said rights 
came into operation before the state had any responsibility or involvement with that particular 
right, and/or where enforcement of the substantive right was no longer possible? 
There is no doubt that the UK’s Secretary of State will be deemed to be an emanation 
of the state
120
, and that the consultation right would have been directly effective against it in 
simple vertical cases, such as if the Secretary of State decided to downsize due to a cut in its 
budget, leading to redundancies in its workforce; however, it only makes sense to hold a right 
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directly effective against the emanation of the state if it had responsibility for providing and 
ensuring compliance with a particular substantive right. It appears to be stretching direct 
effect too far to hold substantive rights directly effective against an emanation of the state, as 
submitted on behalf of USDAW, where the state only becomes involved following failure of 
the right and the subsequent invoking of enforcement provisions; the consequence of 
deciding otherwise is that the Secretary of State would always be held responsible for a 
failure to consult under the CRD where a company goes into liquidation and fails to meet its 
obligation, which would dis-incentivise failing companies to comply with the consultation 
requirement since the responsibilities and liabilities would always pass to the State.
121
  
There exists a disconnect between the role of the Secretary of State and the 
substantive consultation right, since the right only existed at a point in time before the 
involvement of the Secretary of State. This must be the logical conclusion given that on 
liquidation, the right to consult with that company is frustrated, and thus no longer capable of 
being achieved. As such it would appear odd if the mechanism of direct effect, which is 
designed to protect and provide individuals with rights which are enforceable in their national 
courts, should survive and attach to the State which became involved in proceedings at a 
point in time when the original right no longer existed.  
A further implication of finding that vertical direct effect existed in this situation 
would be to extend it in a way that would encroach upon the area of State liability, given that 
this provides a means of holding a state liable where it incorrectly implements a Directive. A 
failure to properly implement the substantive consultation right, which causes damage to an 
individual, is reparable under the principle of State liability so long as it can be established 
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that the breach is sufficiently serious to impose State liability.
122
 To develop vertical direct 
effect in the manner submitted would have the consequence of the state being held liable for 
the losses caused to individuals through a failure to consult without the need to establish that 
the failings of the state with regards implementation of the right was sufficiently serious. 
There appeared to be some confusion in the approach adopted by USDAW in this respect, 
which has led to Marson and Ferris describing both the EAT and CA’s approach as a 
worrying misunderstanding of the principle of direct effect, and that it is a failure ‘…to 
recognise the nature of the enforcement mechanism [and] the distinction between the duty 
and the obligation...’
123
 Consequently, any such alternative argument based upon vertical 
direct effect, even had it been given full consideration by the CJEU, was bound to fail.  
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS  
The concept of ‘establishment’ is a key one in the operation of the CRD, and in particular is 
central in determining whether the redundancy threshold that is set out at Article 1 of the 
CRD has been satisfied. Although the CRD provides MSs with options as to how to achieve 
its aims, this concept appears across the two options: the mischief caused by this, given that 
each respective option imposes other qualifications to be satisfied to attract information and 
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consultation rights, is that a narrow interpretation of establishment under Option 1 increases 
the scope of the information and consultation entitlement, but would have the consequence of 
a decreased scope of entitlement under Option 2, and vice-versa. 
In guiding their decisions in each of the referred cases, namely USDAW, Lyttle and in 
Cañas, the CJEU considered and applied the previous case law that interpreted this term, that 
of Rockfon and Athinaiki. Although one can appreciate the logic of the CJEU, which is 
clearly predicated on the need for consistency and coherency of the term, the decisions need 
to be considered in context: the ECJ when interpreting the term ‘establishment’ in Rockfon 
and Athinaiki were seeking to “…limit as far as possible cases of collective redundancies 
which are not subject to [the CRD]”. This had the consequence, given that these cases 
involved MSs that opted for Option 1 transposition and thus a link between number of 
redundancies and size of the establishment making them, of a narrow interpretation being 
adopted in order to achieve this crucial aim. Had the same aim been the focus in USDAW or 
Lyttle, without the complication of previous decisions, then arguably a wider interpretation 
would have been forthcoming.  
The CJEU appears to consider itself bound by the decisions of Rockfon and Athinaiki, 
detailing that these decisions have interpreted establishment to mean a single employment 
unit; however, a closer examination of these two decisions reveal that the ECJ did not lay 
down such a specific interpretation, but introduced an element of flexibility, which would 
have allowed an alternative interpretation to be attached where the circumstances required it. 
Extending the scope of the CRD through an alternative interpretation of establishment in 
Option 2 MSs so as to‘…limit as far as possible cases of collective redundancies which are 
not subject to [the CRD]’ may have been such requiring circumstances. However, the CJEU 
opted against such an approach in favour of a static interpretation, citing weak rationales 
concerning comparability of protection and reduction of costs. The inevitable consequence of 
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such an approach is to weaken the information and consultation rights of workers in MSs that 
have adopted an Option 2 transposition of the CRD, with the specific facts surrounding the 
closure of Woolworths and Bon Marche stores providing evidence of such.     
The result of these decisions is that, at present, the UK legislative provision fails to 
provide all affected workers with appropriate consultation rights when there are collective 
redundancies being planned at an undertaking, due to introducing a requirement that the 
number of redundancies be calculated at singular establishments rather than across the 
enterprise as a whole.  
The further submission that was referred to the CJEU in USDAW, which is not present 
in the Lyttle or Cañas case, that of vertical direct effect of the consultation right due to the 
Secretary of State being made a party to proceedings, never appeared likely to succeed, and is 
unlikely to have good prospects of success in any future references should any be 
forthcoming. If direct effect is taken through from its development, it is clear that its purpose 
is to ensure that a right that has fully crystallised and is self-standing can be enforced. It is the 
lack of available consultation as a CRD right being in existence at the point of time when the 
Secretary of State has a role to play in the context of the insolvency that ought to preclude 
such a finding. Furthermore, the enforcement mechanism itself simply does not satisfy the 
well-established test for direct effect. To that end, arguably this point is moribund. 
Yet, a more important and interesting legal point, which was dropped before the CA 
in USDAW, was the submission requiring disapplication of the national law and subsequent 
horizontal direct effect of the consultation right. This could have provided the CJEU an 
opportunity to consider the Charter from a different angle than that offered in Association de 
médiation sociale if presented appropriately; not whether the Charter itself could be afforded 
horizontal direct effect, but whether the consultation right contained within the Charter at 
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Article 27 and that found within the CRD were simply manifestations of a general principle 
of EU law, which could thus require disapplication of national law, with the general 
principle, guided by Article 27 and the CRD (similar to the approach adopted in  
Kücükdeveci) then being afforded horizontal direct effect. It appears to be an opportunity 
missed in that respect. This approach may be one for the future, and can certainly be 
considered an option with respect other rights contained within the charter; the success of 
such will ultimately be dependent on convincing the court that a parallel underpinning 
general principle also exists.  
The three decisions of the CJEU may be viewed negatively, at least in terms of 
worker protection as the consequence has been to narrow the scope of the consultation rights 
in Option 2 MSs. A more preferable outcome would have been to place greater focus on the 
central aim of the CRD, worker protection. Equally important is that this approach would 
have been easily reconcilable with Rockfon and Athinaiki, and so would not have required 
these decisions to be departed from, but merely built upon. There are practical impacts that 
would need to have been addressed had the CJEU ruled in this manner: in particular, whether 
large businesses that make use of separate groups would have had to ensure that 
communication lines were sufficient when dealing with redundancies in any aspect of their 
business, since such redundancies across the business as a whole would have had to be 
accumulated when addressing whether a collective redundancy situation had arisen and to 
whom they should consult. Plainly, what the CJEU ought to have done was reiterate the 
Preamble of the Directive: ‘…that greater protection should be afforded to workers in the 
event of collective redundancies while taking into account the need for balanced economic 
and social development within the [EU]…’ To that end, consult is key and to whom that 
consultation must be with remains the crucial question; a question that was thrust into the 
spotlight due to the UK’s pick and mix approach to the CRD of requiring consideration of the 
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term establishment in connection to an Option 2 transposition, and one which the current 
answer does not appear to achieve. Interpreting this term appropriately is crucial, and may 
become an ever-increasingly crucial matter following the vote for Brexit in the UK, and the 
potential consequences that may follow in terms of the predicted job-losses.      
 
 
